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of left-behiNd places aNd people:
Inequality, labour migration and development in India
Abstract
This paper looks at the relationship between inequality, labour migration and development 
in India. It examines migration-inequality-development relationship with a focus on those 
who are left behind in the process of  structural economic transformation and livelihood 
change in India. Processes of  transformation are typically understood through the active 
agents that bring about that change. Migration is largely explored through the actions of  
migrants but there is a dearth of  understanding of  how those who do not migrate, either 
by choice or lack of  options, are affected by migration. While recent years have witnessed 
substantial rise in labour mobility in India, socio-economic inequalities often mean migration 
options are not available to all individuals and households, nor are the outcomes same for all 
members of  the participating households. But it is not adequately known whether and how 
migration relates to wellbeing/illbeing of  the left-behind groups, and under what conditions 
the left-behind gain or lose from migration. This paper reviews the implications of  labour 
migration on the left behind populations in India, and intersecting role inequalities play 
in the process. The discussion in this article also lays out the larger context of  regional 
disparities in development in India that underpin much of  work-related mobility – from 
backward regions to geographies that provide better life and livelihood opportunities. With 
a focus on these two interrelated aspects of  inequalities that include spatial inequalities 
and inequalities between different socio-economic population groups, this paper, based on 
critical survey of  literature, argues that these inequalities are creating left-behind places and left-
behind populations. The paper maps out broad contours of  left-behind geographies in India, 
and for the left-behind populations it identifies three groups who face constraints on their 
mobility including i) left behind households that are unable to migrate due to lack of  financial 
and social capital, ii) left behind women who face socio-cultural restrictions on labour mobility, 
and iii) left behind (educated) youth whose mobility aspirations remain unrealised due to scarce 
availability of  decent jobs. The paper also identifies the potential implications of  being left 
behind and argues for the need to better understand and address the socio-political and 
development implications of  these processes.
Keywords: migration; inequality; development; India; left-behind women; left-behind 
households; left-behind youth.
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1. Introduction
This paper looks at the relationship 
between inequality, labour migration 
and development in India. It examines 
migration-inequality-development 
relationship with a focus on those 
who are left behind in the process of  
structural economic transformation and 
livelihood change in India. The rationale 
for this work stems from a dearth of  
understanding of  how those who do 
not migrate, either by choice or lack 
of  options, are affected by migration. 
Processes of  transformation are 
typically understood through the active 
agents that bring about that change. 
Migration is largely explored through 
the actions of  migrants but there are 
also those who are affected by the 
migration processes even if  they are not 
the most active participants in it. Indeed, 
a picture of  the process of  migration is 
incomplete if  it leaves out those who 
are affected by the same conditions, but 
are unable, for material or other reasons, 
to migrate. Those who are left behind 
cannot escape the conditions that have 
forced the others to leave. In fact, the 
conditions may be worse, in that the 
migrants can take a substantial portion 
of  the local economic and social capital 
with them. In other words, a holistic 
picture of  migration processes and 
outcomes warrants an understanding of  
also those who are left behind. 
The larger context of  this work is 
provided by the major socio-economic 
transformation currently underway in 
India, and its inequitable effects for 
different regions and socio-economic 
groups.1 Following the economic 
reforms since the early 1990s, India has 
witnessed rapid economic growth. This 
high growth has been accompanied by 
a structural economic change in which 
the importance of  agriculture sector has 
diminished, while the nonfarm, urban-
based economic activities have become 
more significant in the framework 
of  national income. The shift in the 
sectoral composition of  income from 
rural agriculture activities to urban 
nonfarm jobs has not however resulted 
in concomitant rise in decent alternative 
employment options for a large majority 
of  India’s population. Much of  India’s 
economic growth post-1990s is driven 
by capital and skill-intensive service 
and business sectors2 which has created 
stable, formal sector employment 
opportunities for a small section of  
highly educated workers in the country, 
while those without the education 
and skills to participate in the new 
economy – which constitutes a sizable 
majority of  country’s population – find 
themselves in precarious, informal 
1 Choithani, Van Duijne & Nijman 2021; Pani 
forthcoming
2  Datt & Ravallion 2011; Kotwal, Ramaswami & 
Wadhwa 2011
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sector jobs and thus are excluded from 
the benefits of  economic boom. Recent 
patterns of  economic growth have also 
led to geographical concentration of  
economic activities and employment in 
a few large cities which has exacerbated 
spatial economic inequalities. This has 
led to substantial increase in labour 
migration from less developed regions 
to places that provide livelihoods. While 
this has inspired much research on the 
role of  migration in reducing poverty 
and promoting development3, the effects 
of  migration for those left behind has 
not received the attention it deserves. 
Socio-economic inequalities often mean 
migration options are not available to 
all individuals and households, nor are 
the outcomes same for all members of  
the participating households. Yet, it is 
not adequately known whether and how 
migration relates to wellbeing/illbeing 
of  the left-behind groups, and under 
what conditions the left-behind gain or 
lose from migration. 
Against this background, this 
paper reviews the implications of  
labour migration on the left behind 
populations in India, and intersecting 
role socio-economic inequalities play 
in the process. In so doing, this paper 
situates inequalities, marginalization 
and exclusion in the context of  rapid 
economic change in India, and also 
3 Deshingker & Farrington 2009
provides the larger context of  regionally 
unbalanced development in India that 
underpin much of  labour mobility 
from backward regions to geographies 
that provide better life and livelihood 
options. The discussion concentrates on 
two interrelated aspects of  inequalities 
that include spatial inequalities and 
inequalities between different socio-
economic population groups, and, 
based on the critical survey of  literature, 
argues that these two forms of  
inequalities are creating left-behind places 
and left-behind populations that necessitate 
a comprehensive understanding of  
their socio-political and development 
implications.
The structure of  this paper is as 
follows. The next section discusses 
the dynamics of  structural economic 
transformation in India, and as such lays 
out the broader context and significance 
of  this work. Section 3 focuses on the 
uneven regional development and 
places left behind. While the focus is 
on India, the discussion in this section 
places these issues in the wider global 
context of  deepening spatial inequalities 
and its implications. Section 4 considers 
the relationship between migration, 
inequalities and left-behind populations, 
and concentrates on three left behind 
groups who face constraints on their 
mobility on account of  various socio-
economic inequalities. These include: 
i) households that are unable to migrate 
NatioNal iNstitute of advaNced studies
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due to lack of  financial and social 
capital, ii) women who face socio-cultural 
restrictions on labour mobility, and iii) 
youth whose mobility aspirations remain 
unrealised due to scarce availability of  
decent jobs. In each case, the discussion 
also identifies the potential implications 
of  being left behind. The final section 
concludes. 
2. Dynamics of structural 
transformation in India
India is in the midst of  a major socio-
economic transformation. Following 
the liberalization reforms since the 
early 1990s, India has achieved rapid 
economic growth. These reforms have 
also fundamentally altered the nature 
of  Indian economy and livelihoods. 
The significance of  agriculture sector 
has diminished, and recent economic 
growth has been led by urban-based 
nonfarm sectors making use of  migrant 
labour from rural areas. Cities and towns 
now account for nearly two-thirds of  
national income in India.4 At the same 
time, this has not resulted into more 
permanent migration and urbanization, 
and much of  the labour migration in 
India is of  temporary, circular nature.5 
The growing importance of  urban 
incomes in rural lives and livelihoods 
notwithstanding, most migrants find jobs 
4 Planning Commission 2011, p. 378
5 Kundu 2003; Deshingkar & Farrington 2009; 
Tumbe 2012; Choithani 2017
in the informal economy characterised 
by high precarity.6 The precariousness 
and uncertainty of  urban jobs as well as 
a complex mix of  socio-cultural reasons 
mean that migrants continue to remain 
connected with origin villages.7 In other 
words, structural transformation in 
India has created new opportunities and 
precarities at once. From the perspective 
of  this research, there are three 
interlinked elements of  this transition: 
livelihood shifts out of  agriculture, 
rise in rural-urban labour migration 
and inequalities and precarities in the 
process of  livelihood transition.
First, the past three decades have 
witnessed massive shifts of  employment 
out of  agriculture. Agriculture still 
remains the mainstay for the largest 
share of  the workforce, but the sector 
has been under tremendous stress to 
support lives and livelihoods. Between 
1990 and 2019, the share of  agriculture 
sector in national income more than 
halved – from 33 percent to 16 percent.8 
Although the process of  structural 
economic change inevitably involves 
sectoral composition of  income 
shifting towards nonfarm activities, 
agriculture sector also witnessed policy 
neglect, particularly in the first decade 
of  liberalization reforms. The annual 
growth rate of  public investment in 
6 Breman 1996
7 De Haan 2002
8 Mehrotra et al. 2013; World Bank 2021
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agriculture was 4 percent in 1980s, 
which declined to 1.9 percent in 1990s.9 
Compounding these challenges facing 
Indian agriculture is the progressive 
fragmentation of  already small land 
parcels over time, owing to demographic 
pressures and intergenerational 
transfers of  land. Farming in India 
has traditionally involved smallholding 
which means that agriculture sector 
has always faced the problem of  
underemployment, or disguised 
unemployment. But these pressures have 
intensified due to further diminution 
in average land size over the past few 
decades. In India, land transfers typically 
involve intergenerational inheritance 
of  land from parents to children, and 
persistently high fertility over the past 
few decades has caused subdivision of  
fixed quantity of  land within the family, 
resulting in even smaller average land 
parcels. Between 1970-71 and 2015-
16, average landholding size more than 
halved from 2.28 hectare to 1.08 hectare 
(Figure 1). The combined effect of  these 
processes has been that the share of  
people dependent on farm employment 
has been declining rapidly in recent 
years. Data from successive rounds of  
Indian Census show that between 1991 
and 2001, over 7 million workers whose 
main occupation was cultivation quit 
farming. This trend accelerated in the 
9  Gillespie & Kadiyala 2012, p. 175
following decade, with 8.6 million main 
cultivators leaving farm work during 
2001-2011.10 More recent estimates 
based on National Sample Survey and 
Periodic Labour Force Survey data 
show that between 2004 and 2016 there 
has been a net loss of  40 million jobs 
in agriculture, and for the first time in 
the history of  independent India the 
share of  agricultural employment has 
fallen to less than 50 percent.11 The real 
magnitude of  these livelihood shifts out 
of  agriculture is perhaps even greater, 
and with an average household size 
of  5 members, 40 million jobs losses 
in agriculture means that 200 million 
people are affected in their daily lives 
in this transformation.12 This transition 
has also produced significant distress, 
visible in the spate of  farmers’ suicides 
across the country.13
Second, this transition out of  
agriculture parallels substantial increase 
in labour migration in India. The 
highly seasonal nature of  agriculture 
incomes means that India’s rural past 
has never been sedentary, and labour 
migration has traditionally formed a key 
component of  livelihoods of  many rural 
households across India.14 But recent 
10 Census of  India 1991, 2001, 2011a
11 Himanshu 2011; Thomas 2012; Mehrotra et al. 
2013; Mehrotra et al. 2014; Abraham 2017; Van 
Duijne & Nijman 2019
12 Choithani, Van Duijne & Nijman 2021
13 Banerjee 2019; Pani & Banerjee 2019
14 De Haan 2002; Tumbe 2012
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years have witnessed unprecedented 
surge in labour mobility.15 It is estimated 
that over 100 million people remain on 
the move for their livelihoods, and that 
migrants constitute 20 percent of  the 
total workforce of  500 million people.16 
Labour migration in India predominantly 
involves semi-permanent, seasonal and 
circular moves, with migrants working 
outside the villages but remaining firmly 
connected with their origin places. 
Much of  these temporary moves are 
unaccounted for in the official data 
sources which are geared to capture 
more permanent forms of  migration. 
15 Deshingkar & Farrington 2009; Choithani 2017; 
Tumbe 2018; Choithani, Van Duijne & Nijman 
2021
16 Deshingkar & Akhter 2009; Government of  
India 2017
This circular mobility is the reason 
why migrants are variously described 
as ‘footloose labour’17 and ‘unsettled 
settlers’18; this non-permanent migration 
has also kept the overall urbanization 
levels low in India.19 Although circular, 
recent evidence shows that migrants 
now spend longer duration away from 
their origin places, suggesting the rising 
significance of  nonlocal incomes in 
households’ lives and livelihoods.20 
Indeed, rural India is witnessing what 
Rigg, Salmanca & Parnwell call as “a 
delocalization of  life and living”.21 
Another important change concerns 
17 Breman 1996
18 De Haan 1997
19 Kundu 2003
20 Choithani, Van Duijne & Nijman 2021
21 Rigg, Salmanca & Parnwell 2012, p. 1470
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migration destinations. Earlier migration 
streams in India predominantly involved 
rural to rural circulation of  labour. While 
rural-rural migration continues, rising 
agrarian stress and urban-centric nature 
of  economic growth are changing the 
patterns of  migration, with rural to 
urban migration rising in significance.22 
In India, urban economic growth has 
come to play a more central role in 
eliminating poverty in the post-reform 
period, and returns from migration to 
cities and towns have increased.23
Third, these processes of  economic 
transformation and livelihood change 
are marked by various spatial and socio-
economic inequalities. These inequalities 
have a bearing on the course of  
transformation, and the transformation 
is, in turn, generating new inequalities.24 
The uneven geography of  development 
in India means that there are huge 
regional variations in agrarian pressures 
and availability of  alternative jobs. 
And these inequalities have grown 
starker since the economic reforms 
of  early 1990s when balanced spatial 
development that formed part of  early 
Indian development planning post-
independence was thrown out of  the 
window to pave way for market forces 
to determine economic geography 
22  National Sample Survey 2010
23 Deshingkar & Grimm 2005; Datt & Ravillion 
2011
24 Pani forthcoming
(see below). The more remunerative, 
alterative nonfarm jobs have come to 
be concentrated in large cities, mostly 
in western and southern Indian states 
of  Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, 
Kerala and Tamil Nadu. On the other 
hand, the states in the northern and 
eastern parts of  the country including 
Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, Madhya 
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal and 
Uttar Pradesh where agrarian decline has 
been most pronounced in recent years25 
have been left behind. It is important 
to note that there are wide intrastate 
disparities in development, too. Indeed, 
within the advanced states in the west 
and south, incomes and jobs have 
concentrated in a few big cities which 
has produced uneven spatial dividends 
within these states. For example, in 
Karnataka, the north and south diverge 
enormously, with the former lagging far 
behind the latter on income and human 
development indicators. In 2017-18, 
whereas nine of  the 10 districts with 
highest per capita incomes were from 
the south, nine of  the 10 districts with 
the lowest per capita incomes were in 
the north.26 Karnataka’s capital city of  
Bengaluru boasts of  being the IT capital 
of  India and is widely integrated with 
global economy as a key resource city27, 
25 Bajar 2020; Choithani, Van Duijne & Nijman 
2021
26 Government of  Karnataka 2018, p. 43
27 Pani 2009
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while Yadgir district, just a few hundred 
kilometres north, lacks the most basic 
infrastructure with nearly 90 percent 
of  households not even having toilet 
facility within their housing premise.28 
In other words, India’s economic 
transformation that is characterised 
by wide geographical inequalities 
within and between states has created 
left-behind places – geographies that 
have experienced economic/agrarian 
decline but scarce alternative nonfarm 
employment.
The response of  the individuals 
and households inhabiting these left-
behind geographies has been to migrate 
for alternative jobs. However, this 
process of  livelihood transition remains 
beset with precarities and inequalities. 
While there is compelling evidence 
that shows that migration can provide 
an important escape route out of  
vulnerability and promote sustainable 
human development outcomes29, these 
choices are not available to all. As 
McDowell & De Haan note, “migration 
options are not, as hypothesized by 
individualistic theories, open to all.”30 
Socio-economic inequalities often 
determine who migrates and benefits 
from migration. Migration requires 
financial resources, social networks 
28 Census of  India 2011b
29 Deshingkar & Akhter 2009; Deshingkar & 
Farrington 2009; UNDP 2009; Pani 2019
30 McDowell & De Haan 1998, p. 21
and information on work destinations, 
and many aspirants lack these means 
to successfully partake in migration. 
Additionally, attributes such as age and 
gender and social roles pertaining to 
these demographic characteristics also 
play a key role. The precarious nature of  
India’s rural transition where a majority 
of  new nonfarm, urban-based jobs 
are increasingly informal with no job 
security and social protection can lead to 
aspirational-mismatch where potential 
participants, particularly young adults, 
choose to stay back in the rural areas than 
to migrate to the towns. In other words, 
inequalities of  various kinds can lead to 
different population groups being left 
behind in the transition process. These 
can include: i) households that are not able 
to migrate, ii) women who face socio-
cultural restrictions on their work-
related mobility, and iii) youth who do 
not to migrate due to failed aspirations. 
In other words, structural economic 
change in India is creating left-behind 
places and populations which have 
huge socio-political implications. In the 
next two sections, I focus on these left-
behind places and people. 
3. Uneven regional 
development and places left 
behind
At the global level, the past few 
years have witnessed resurfacing of  
uneven development as a key policy 
Of left-behind places and peOple
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issue. Importantly, there is increasing 
recognition that spatially unbalanced 
development can leave places behind 
which can have significant socio-
political implications. Two major events 
have been crucial to direct attention 
to geographical inequalities. These 
include: election of  Donald Trump 
as the President of  the United States 
(US) in 2016; and in the same year the 
referendum in the United Kingdom 
(UK) on European Union’s (EU) 
membership which ultimately resulted in 
UK’s exit from EU in early 2020, ending 
47-year-long relationship. In both 
instances, spatial economic inequalities 
seem to have shaped these political 
outcomes, and it was the discontented 
voters from the geographies of  despair 
who used ballot boxes to express their 
anger and frustration on being left 
behind. As Rodríguez-Pose notes: 
“In recent years the places that “don’t 
matter” have increasingly used the ballot 
box (and, in some cases, outright revolt) 
to rebel against the feeling of  being left 
behind; against the feeling of  lacking 
opportunities and future prospects.”31 
In the US, Donald Trump’s victory was 
powered by voters in rural America and 
industrial Midwest.32 The incidence of  
poverty has historically been higher 
in rural than in urban America which 
31 Rodríguez-Pose 2018, p. 190
32 Whitkar 2016; Monnat & Brown 2018
continues to be the case today.33 And 
the erstwhile industrial heartland in 
the Midwest that once provided high-
paying manufacturing jobs has suffered 
from years of  deindustrialisation and 
economic decline, population loss, and 
physical decay – reasons why the region 
came to be called the Rust Belt.34 In the 
UK, wealth and gainful employment 
have come to be concentrated in the 
Southeast, notably London, whereas 
the north has fallen behind.35 Analysis 
of  the relationship between structural 
transformation and economic growth 
in 85 cities in Great Britain between 
1971 and 2014 shows that “many of  
the fastest growing cities have been in 
the southern half  of  Britain (roughly 
south of  a line between the Severn 
and Humber) and most of  the slowest 
growing cites have been in the north.”36 
While the Brexit Leave vote did not 
reflect the simple north-south divide and 
won right across England and Wales37, 
there was a geography to it which closely 
corresponded to the socio-economic 
differences across regions. The Brexit 
Leave vote came primarily from left-
behind localities where economic and 
social decline caused political alienation 
to become entrenched. Thus: 
33 Theide et al. 2017
34 Hackworth 2019
35 Rowthorn 2010
36 Tyler et al. 2017, p. 430
37 BBC 2021
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The public vote for Brexit was 
anchored predominantly, albeit not 
exclusively, in areas of  the country 
that are filled with pensioners, low-
skilled and less well-educated bluecollar 
workers and citizens who have been 
pushed to the margins not only by 
the economic transformation of  
the country over recent decades but 
also by the values that have come to 
dominate a more socially liberal media 
and political class. In this respect the 
vote for Brexit was delivered by the 
‘left behind’ – social groups that are 
united by a general sense of  insecurity, 
pessimism and marginalisation, who 
do not feel as though elites, whether 
in Brussels or Westminster, share their 
values, represent their interests and 
genuinely empathise with their intense 
angst about rapid social, economic and 
cultural change.38
In terms of  how economics and 
politics coalesce at the community level, 
McKay’s study using British Election 
Study data shows that economic context 
holds significance in understanding 
perceived community representation, 
and living in low-income community 
is associated with negative views on 
community participation. This, in turn, 
leads to grievance wherein people are 
particularly negative about community 
representation when they believe that 
the national economy is more successful 
38 Goodwin and Heath 2016, p. 331
than that of  one's local community.39 
The fall of  some places in rank and 
clout has been particularly remarkable. 
For instance, in the US, Detroit in 
Michigan which once commanded the 
status of  “Motor Car Capital of  the 
World”40 now suffers from among the 
highest poverty, unemployment and 
physical decay.41 In northern UK, the 
city of  Liverpool, once known for its 
global cotton industry, is among the top 
10 city councils with highest proportion 
of  neighbourhoods facing extreme 
deprivation42 (though the economy of  
Liverpool is reviving and the majority 
Brexit vote there was for Remain). To 
be sure, this decline has a complex 
history, and is also rooted in social ills, 
such as racial tensions.43 But they are 
also a product of  policies. For instance, 
in the UK many of  the cities that 
achieved higher economic performance 
than the national average in the past 
four decades (1971-2014), such as 
Cambridge, Reading, Southampton, 
“were assisted by British spatial policy 
to become centres of  growth.”44 
Economic globalization is at the 
heart of  these shifts. The globalization-
induced economic restructuring that 
39 McKay 2019
40 Bonello 1993, p. 177
41 Sugrue 1996; Hackworth 2019.
42 Lock 2019; also see Tyler et al. 2017. 
43 Sugrue 1996
44 Tyler et al. 2017, p. 432
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started in 1980s and accelerated towards 
the end of  twentieth century has had 
profound effects on spatial patterns 
of  development. The shift toward a 
free-market economy, characterised by 
unobstructed trade and discouragement 
of  state regulation, has resulted into 
competitive advantage for some places 
while marginalising other localities 
in the increasingly integrated global 
economy. Much of  the manufacturing 
has now moved to the developing 
countries that provide cheap labour 
which has contributed to the decline of  
old industrial centers of  the developed 
world. Meanwhile, the economies of  
the countries in the Global North have 
come to dominate high-value, specialised 
service activities, such as finance and 
banking, which have added to the 
industrial decline in these countries. 
Indeed, the policies that facilitated the 
growth of  financial industry were often 
harmful to manufacturing and other 
industrial activities. Crucially, moreover, 
the growth of  specialised services 
located in major cities of  advanced 
economies which created ‘global cities’ 
also debilitated the economic base of  
other places within these countries.45 The 
challenges of  these places facing decline 
and neglect were further compounded 
by state’s retreat from provisioning 
of  social goods. The US and UK led 
45 Sassen 1991
the way in this “neoliberal turn”46, 
and it is perhaps not coincidental that 
voices against economic globalization 
have been the strongest in these two 
countries, emanating particularly from 
the left-behind geographies from within 
these nations. 
But the US and UK are not alone, 
and geographical inequalities between 
and within the countries have increased 
the world over. Indeed, “a number of  
territories across the world are being left 
behind, experiencing long periods of  
decline. Whether it is Bihar in India, the 
central lowlands of  Thailand, parts of  
East Germany, Champagne-Ardenne 
or Lorraine in France or Michigan and 
Ohio in the US”.47 Over the past few 
decades, the economic policies have 
increasingly supported concentrated 
growth. The idea underpinning this 
development model is that there is 
a geographical logic to economic 
activity. Markets favour places that 
allow economic production at reduced 
costs and generate greater returns to 
scale, and this fosters geographical 
concentration of  economic activity. This 
also leads to population densification as 
economic opportunities attract people 
to move to these places. This spatial 
clustering creates agglomeration economies 
that refer to “the benefits that come 
46 Harvey 2005, p. 9
47 Rodríguez-Pose 2018, p. 196
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when firms and people locate near one 
another together in cities and industrial 
clusters”.48 These agglomeration effects 
also provide a key explanation for the 
existence of  cities.49 These densely 
populated places provide a conducive 
environment for efficient production 
of  goods and services because they 
have access to a pool of  skilled labour, 
network of  complementary firms, and 
a critical mass of  consumers of  those 
goods and services. The co-location of  
complementary firms allows for sharing 
of  physical infrastructure that reduces 
production costs as well as human 
resources that fosters innovation.50 
The conceptual roots of  this thinking 
lie in Paul Krugman’s seminal work 
on Geography and Trade that sought to 
explain large agglomerations as arising 
from increasing returns, trade costs, 
differences in factor prices in which 
geography (distance) plays a key role; 
and this was the beginning of  what 
later came to be known as New Economic 
Geography.51 Much of  the agglomeration 
literature is focused on manufacturing, 
and the theoretical-empirical work 
on services-led agglomeration is 
scarce. Nonetheless, the argument 
increasingly appears to extend to 
48 Glaesar 2010, p. 1
49 Scott & Stropher 2015; Scott 2017
50 Duranton & Puga 2004; Rosenthal & Strange 
2011; Scott & Stropher 2015
51 Krugman 1991, 2011; also see Fujita & Krugman 
2004
services, particularly some key sub-
sectors such as business services where 
the “classical sources of  agglomeration 
economies, in particular localisation 
and urbanisation externalities” continue 
to have relevance.52 Indeed, as Saskia 
Sassen’s work on global cities shows, 
globalization and territorial dispersion 
of  economic activity has in fact created 
a need for central control and command 
centers, and in what may seem to be 
a puzzle “the more globalized the 
economy becomes, the higher the 
agglomeration of  central functions 
in a relatively few sites” that provide 
specialised services and innovations 
to support geographically dispersed 
economic activity.53 
The World Bank has been a vocal 
supporter of  this concentrated model 
of  economic growth, arguing that it is 
associated with increased prosperity. 
This stance is reflected in its 2009 
World Development Report: Reshaping 
Economic Geography that noted that the 
“geographically disadvantaged people 
cope every day with the reality that 
development does not bring economic 
prosperity everywhere at once; markets 
favor some places over others. But 
dispersing production more broadly does 
not necessarily foster prosperity.”54 The 
report main argument is that economic 
52 Meliciani & Savona 2015, 389
53 Sassen 1991, p. 5
54 World Bank 2009, xiii
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growth is a geographically uneven 
process driven by density (population 
agglomeration, scale economies), 
distance (geographic mobility) and 
division (economic integration), and 
growth can be fostered by policies that 
facilitate agglomeration, factor mobility 
and economic integration within and 
between nations. In other words, wealth 
concentrates in some places more than 
others. “To get a part of  this wealth, you 
have to get closer to it.”55 The World 
Bank’s suggestion to address spatial 
imbalances in development is to institute 
social policies, such as those related 
to health, education and nutrition, 
to promote inclusive outcomes – a 
stance which deviates from its earlier 
position of  economic austerity for 
social sector spending it advocated 
through the structural adjustment 
programmes which produced huge 
discontents.56 Moreover, institutions to 
deliver social protection remain weak in 
many countries. Not unexpectedly, this 
concentrated growth model has also had 
the effect of  widening spatial disparities. 
This effect has been particularly severe 
in many developing countries where 
globalization has increased overall 
national prosperity, but the economic 
growth has tended to concentrate in 
large urban centers. 
55 ibid, xix
56 Stiglitz 2002
This is particularly the case in 
India which has witnessed widening 
of  geographical disparities since the 
economic reforms of  early 1990s. It 
is not that regional inequality surfaced 
as an issue only after the liberalization 
reforms towards the end of  the 
twentieth century. Indeed, differences 
in economic performance across the 
various regions has been a key historical 
feature of  India’s development.57 But 
Indian policymakers were cognisant of  
regional economic disparities and their 
implications for equitable growth. In 
the first four decades after country’s 
independence from the British rule 
in 1947, development planning thus 
sought to promote balanced regional 
development. This thinking is reflected 
in the second five-year plan (1956-61) 
document that noted:
In any comprehensive plan of  
development, it is axiomatic that the 
special needs of  the less developed 
areas should receive due attention. 
The pattern of  investment must be so 
devised as to lead to balanced regional 
development…as development 
proceeds and large resources become 
available for investment, the stress of  
developmental programmes should be 
on extending the benefit of  investments 
to underdeveloped regions.58 
57 Roy 2020
58 Planning Commission 1957, p. 36
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In the centrally planned economy, 
influenced by the Soviet model, 
public sector was used as an engine 
of  economic growth, and retained 
ownership of  key industries. Private 
enterprise was regulated through 
licensing regime which determined the 
scale and location of  private investment. 
This regulation of  economic activity 
came at a cost. For the first three 
decades after the independence Indian 
economy grew at an average rate of  3.5 
percent which came to be called the 
Hindu rate of  growth.59 But balanced 
regional development remained an 
important goal, and public sector was 
viewed as key to achieving this objective. 
Besides, several other policy initiatives 
showed this commitment to equitable 
development. For example, the key 
objective of  Freight Equalization Policy 
1952 that subsidized transport costs 
of  raw materials, such as iron ore and 
minerals, so that cost of  industrial inputs 
was the same everywhere in India was 
to promote balanced industrial growth 
across different parts of  the country. 
Despite these policy initiatives, regional 
inequalities remained widespread as 
differences in several geographical, 
historical, and institutional factors 
also determined patterns of  regional 
development which continue to shape 
these differences. For instance, a 
59 Kar & Sakthivel 2007, p. 69. 
study that compared the economic 
performance of  different regions of  
India which were put under different 
colonial land revenue institutions of  
zamindari (where landlords collected 
revenues), raiyatwari (in which individual 
cultivators paid land revenue), and 
mahalwari (whereby village bodies 
were jointly responsible for the land 
revenue) found that places where 
landlords were put in-charge to collect 
land revenues from the cultivators 
had poorer economic outcomes post-
independence (reflected in agriculture 
performance, public investment in 
education and health, as well as health 
and educational outcomes) than those 
places where these intermediaries were 
avoided. The study noted that these 
differences potentially arose because 
the oppressive nature of  landlord-
based system meant that cultivators 
saw their interested as different from 
the landlords which, in turn, precluded 
the opportunity for collective action.60 
In other cases, even though equitable 
regional development was the stated 
policy aim, Indian government’s own 
measures undermined this goal. For 
example, Green Revolution reforms 
were systematically inserted in northwest 
states of  Haryana and Punjab which 
brought prosperity in these states, 
while the economically backward state 
60 Banerjee & Iyer 2005
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of  Bihar, located in the same Gangetic 
basin and thus suited for these agrarian 
reforms, was bypassed. Additionally, 
the Freight Equalization Policy that 
sought to promote industrial parity also 
wiped out the competitive advantage 
of  backward states in eastern India.61 
Nonetheless, there was some attempt to 
reconcile the development differences 
between the regions until 1980.
This goal has been abandoned 
subsequently. The Indian constitution 
includes the provision of  Finance 
Commission, appointed every five years, 
that is mandated with a task of  fair 
distribution of  tax receipts between the 
federal and several state governments, 
and backward states often receive 
special grants for their developmental 
needs.62 But the Indian state no longer 
formally regulates the location of  
economic activities. Beginning in the 
1980s, Indian policymakers introduced 
a slew of  reform measures, including 
relaxations in industrial regulations 
and rationalization of  the tax system, 
to improve economic performance of  
the country.63 Economic policy change 
gathered momentum in early 1990s 
when, faced with the balance of  payment 
crisis, Indian government initiated more 
systematic reforms and liberalised its 
61 Singh & Stern 2013
62 Government of  India 1951; Finance 
Commission 2021
63 Rodrik 2002
economy. Strict regulatory controls 
on private entrepreneurial activities 
that characterized the License Raj were 
removed, and foreign capital was 
invited to invest in Indian industries and 
businesses. This liberalization of  Indian 
economy has resulted in faster economic 
growth and enabled the country to break 
away from the pattern of  Hindu rate 
of  growth.64 India’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) grew at an average 
annual rate of  5.6 percent in 1980s and 
1990s and close to 7 percent since early 
2000s (Figure 2), making the country 
one of  the fastest growing economies 
of  the world. The faster economic 
growth has also led to decline in overall 
poverty.65 However, this new economic 
trajectory has also resulted in widening 
of  regional inequalities, as noted earlier. 
The evidence shows that the average 
incomes and living standards across 
Indian states have tended to diverge in 
the period following the liberalization 
reforms. Economic growth is found 
to be positively associated with initial 
levels of  development, and the Indian 
states with better human capital and 
physical infrastructure have been able to 
attract greater investment and achieve 
faster growth rates.66 The deregulation 
of  the economy has allowed private 
64 Panagriya 2004
65 Deaton & Dreze 2002
66 Rao, Shand & Kalirajan 1999; Dasgupta et al. 
2000; Kurian 2000; Sachs, Bajpai & Ramiah 2002
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enterprise to flourish but private capital 
has favoured states that were ahead in 
development curve. The foreign capital 
shows signs of  concentration in a few 
states, mostly in western and southern 
India. Between 2000 and 2012, six 
states including Maharashtra, Delhi, 
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and 
Andhra Pradesh together accounted 
for over 70 per cent of  foreign direct 
investment flows.67
On the other hand, the backward 
states in the north and east of  the country 
that include Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya 
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh, Odisha have languished. 
Lagging far behind on demographic 
67 Mukerjee 2012, p. 100
transition, these seven states account 
for nearly half  of  India’s population 
but they rank lowest on many key social 
and economic indicators – reasons why 
they came to be called BIMARU68; 
these states suffer from high population 
pressures, underdeveloped economies, 
and poor infrastructure.69 Figure 3 
68 Census of  India 2011a; Bose 2000
69 BIMARU means morbid or sick in Hindi. The 
term was coined by Indian demographer, Ashish 
Bose, as an acronym for socio-demographically 
backward states for Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, 
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. In 2000, the states 
of  Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand were carved out 
of  Madhya Pradesh and Bihar, respectively, and 
hence were part of  BIMARU states. Although 
Odisha was not part of  Bose’s original coinage, 
the levels of  socio-economic backwardness in 
the state was comparable, and the acronym thus 
later became BIMARUO to include Odisha in 
this grouping.
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2021; 
GDP at constant 2010 USD prices.  
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Figure 3: Population in multidimensional poverty in Indian states, 2020
Source: Author’s work based on global multidimensional poverty index data by Alkire, Kanagaratnam 
and Suppa (2020). Notes: i) J & K = Jammu & Kashmir; ii) the data on which this MPI is based 
were collected in 2015-16 when Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh were one state. Hence the MPI 
headcount ratio for the undivided Jammu and Kashmir is applied on both.
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Table 1: Human development index for Indian states, 1990-2019
 1990 2000 2010 2019
Andhra Pradesh 0.422 0.475 0.578 0.649
Assam 0.408 0.485 0.564 0.613
Bihar 0.376 0.433 0.512 0.574
Gujarat 0.469 0.525 0.604 0.672
Haryana 0.465 0.547 0.633 0.708
Himachal Pradesh 0.478 0.587 0.666 0.725
Karnataka 0.442 0.515 0.604 0.683
Kerala 0.545 0.598 0.716 0.782
Madhya Pradesh 0.403 0.455 0.535 0.603
Maharashtra 0.493 0.556 0.644 0.697
Orissa 0.397 0.455 0.533 0.605
Punjab 0.496 0.577 0.656 0.724
Rajasthan 0.401 0.465 0.546 0.628
Tamil Nadu 0.470 0.54 0.646 0.709
Uttar Pradesh 0.393 0.459 0.532 0.594
West Bengal 0.439 0.503 0.571 0.641
India 0.429 0.494 0.579 0.646
Source: Radboud university’s global data lab, 2021
presents the multidimensional poverty 
index (MPI) for Indian states for 2020. 
MPI is a summary measure of  wellbeing 
that captures acute deprivations in 
health, education and living standards 
that people face simultaneously. As 
is evident, poverty and deprivation 
remain widespread in these states, with 
all having 30 percent or more of  their 
population facing multidimensional 
poverty. The states of  Bihar, Jharkhand, 
Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh had 
over 40 percent of  their populations 
in multidimensional poverty, and these 
four states were home to more than 
half  (196 million) of  the 364 million 
multidimensionally poor in India. The 
contrast between some states in the 
north and south is striking. For example, 
in 2015-16 only one percent of  Kerala’s 
population was MPI poor, whereas 52 
percent of  population in Bihar suffered 
from multidimensional poverty.70 
70 Oxford Poverty and Human Development 
Initiative 2018; Alkire, Kanagaratnam & Suppa 
2020
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In recent years, these states have 
seen positive changes in living standards, 
but poverty and underdevelopment 
remain widespread still. This is also 
reflected in data in Table 1 that shows 
human development index (HDI) for 16 
large Indian states from 1990 to 2019. 
There has been improvement in human 
development in all states over the 30-
year period. At the same time, levels 
of  human development vary widely 
across Indian states. Importantly, the 
poor states in the east and north have 
occupied the lowest rungs throughout 
this period, with Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh 
being consistently among the bottom 
four states. Indeed, some of  these states 
have human development outcomes 
that are comparable to countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, while average 
living standards in the states in the west 
and south, such as Kerala and Tamil 
Nadu, mirror those of  upper middle-
income countries.71 Like England, there 
is a longstanding north-south divide 
in India which seems to have only 
sharpened in the past few years. This 
divide occasionally becomes a matter of  
regional pride, and frequently spills into 
political domain with rich states in the 
south resenting subsidizing the north. 
Raising the demand for a separate 
state flag, the former Chief  Minister 
71 Dreze & Sen 2013
of  southern Indian state of  Karnataka 
recently remarked:
Historically, the South has been 
subsidizing the north. Six states south 
of  the Vindhyas contribute more taxes 
and get less. For example, for every 
one rupee of  tax contributed by Uttar 
Pradesh that state receives Rs 1.79. For 
every one rupee of  tax contributed 
by Karnataka, the state receives Rs 
0.47. While I recognize the need for 
correcting regional imbalances, where 
is the reward for development?72
Crucially, moreover, the backward 
states in the north and east of  the country 
have witnessed tremendous pressure on 
agrarian livelihoods in recent years, but 
their secondary and tertiary sectors have 
shown no signs of  development. The 
benefits of  economic reforms seem to 
have largely bypassed these states, and 
structural economic change appears 
to have increased marginalization. A 
recent study based on district-wise 
analysis of  Indian census occupational 
data shows that between 2001 and 
2011 many districts in the northern 
and eastern states witnessed increase in 
marginal workers, defined as those who 
worked for less than 6 months in the 
year preceding the census. In fact, as 
per 2011 census marginal workers were 
highly concentrated in these states. On 
the other hand, states in southern and 
72 Siddaramaiah 2018
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western India saw decrease in work 
marginalization. The study summarizes 
the regional patterns of  this livelihood 
“transition into marginalization” as: 
In 2011, there has been a substantial 
increase in districts with more than 40 
percent of  total workers working as 
marginal workers and these were largely 
concentrated within states of  Bihar, 
Jharkhand, Orissa, parts of  Andhra 
Pradesh and eastern Uttar Pradesh in 
an almost continuous fashion. Where 
marginalization of  work has increased 
in concentration in eastern parts of  
the country, there has been a decline 
in marginal workers in south India 
and in Maharashtra. The nature of  
the transition of  moving away from 
main agriculture work and becoming 
a marginal worker is most visible in 
Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal and 
Orissa, as well as parts of  Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.73
It is important to note that there 
are wide spatial inequalities within the 
economically advanced states in the 
south and west India. Indeed, several 
districts within these states resemble 
those in BIMARUO group. A 2015 study 
that analyses regional backwardness 
at the level of  sub-district/taluk (first 
such attempt so far) showed that while 
poverty and deprivation was highly 
concentrated in backward states (with 
a large majority of  100 most backward 
73 Bajar 2020, pp. 86-88
districts located in Bihar, Jharkhand, 
Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, 
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh), developed 
states also had pockets of  deprivation 
within them. Thus:
…the remarkable characteristic of  
regional disparities in India is the 
presence of  backward areas even 
within states that have grown faster 
and are at relatively high income levels 
on average… District-level poverty 
estimates confirm that the poorest 
districts in India lie not only in undivided 
BIMARU states and Odisha, but also 
in rich states such as Maharashtra, 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu.74 
In the post-1990 period India’s 
economic growth has been highly 
urban-centric in general; and within 
these more advanced states that have 
benefitted the most from India’s 
economic policy change, growth has 
been highly concentrated in large cities. 
Moreover, much of  the recent growth 
is accounted for by capital and skill 
intensive business and service sectors75 
which have benefitted a small section of  
highly educated workforce in the cities, 
while a large majority of  country’s rural 
populace without formal education and 
skills to participate in this new economy 
has been left behind. The growth of  key 
service sectors, such as IT industry in 
74 Bakshi, Chawla & Shah 2015, p. 46
75 Kotwal, Ramaswami & Wadhwa 2011
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Bangalore, has led to substantial rise in 
disposable incomes, and has created a 
global middle class.76 At the same time, 
poorer, geographically remote regions 
have not been part of  India’s economic 
boom. Indeed, some social analysts have 
observed that the “growth process is so 
biased, making the country look more 
and more like islands of  California 
in a sea of  sub-Saharan Africa.”77 
Bangalore’s while-collar, IT sector jobs 
have remained the preserve of  “urban, 
middle class and high or middle caste” 
populations78; and in the peripheries of  
the same city so widely integrated in 
the global economic circuits, durability 
of  caste has prevented the traditionally 
disadvantaged social groups, such as 
Dalits, to fight historic disadvantage and 
sufficiently reap the benefits of  digital 
communication technologies.79  
While India’s recent economic 
growth has tended to favour skill-
intensive tertiary sectors, some urban 
nonfarm sectors intensive in unskilled 
labour, such as construction, have also 
grown in the post-reform period which 
has increased the overall demand for 
unskilled labour.80 These jobs are highly 
informal and precarious. But in the 
context of  dwindling fortunes of  farm-
76 Upadhya 2008
77 Dreze & Sen 2013, p. ix
78 Upadhya 2007, p. 1863
79 Kamath 2018
80 Datt & Ravallion 2011
based livelihoods, these urban informal 
jobs provide an important alternative 
to millions of  people transitioning 
their livelihoods away from farming.81 
Although exclusionary, urban economic 
growth has also become a significant 
driver of  rural poverty reduction in the 
period following economic reforms.82 
Agrarian stress and urban-centric 
growth are prompting a growing 
number of  people from rural areas to 
migrate to cities and towns. Much of  
this labour migration involves semi-
permanent, circular moves given the 
precarious nature of  these jobs, while 
permanent work-related migration to 
cities for decent, formal sector job 
is predominantly undertaken by the 
better-off  segments.83 Patterns of  
temporary, circular migration also vary 
widely depending on the distance to 
labour markets. In rural places situated 
closer to towns that provide alternative 
nonfarm jobs commuting and short-
distance migration are important forms 
of  mobility, while migration pattern in 
villages located away from job centers 
involves people moving long distances 
for livelihoods.84 There is compelling 
evidence to suggests that migration 
can provide an important route out of  
poverty and adversity, with remittances 
81 Choithani, Van Duijne & Nijman 2021
82 Datt & Ravallion 2011
83 Tumbe 2018, p. 36
84 Pani forthcoming
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closely tied to the wellbeing of  migrant 
households.85 While this is the case, 
migration options are not open to all. 
Structural economic change in India 
remains beset with various socio-
economic inequalities that constrain 
mobility chances for many households 
and individuals. These inequalities 
operate at different levels, they are 
mediated through complex economic 
and socio-cultural processes, and their 
effects vary widely across population 
groups. But in effect, they create left-
behind populations, defined as those 
individuals and/or households who 
lack real opportunities to benefit 
from migration. The next section 
turns attention to these left-behind 
populations.
4. Migration, inequalities 
and left-behind populations
Michael Lipton’s seminal work on 
migration-inequality nexus showed 
that they share a two-way, reciprocal 
relationship.86 Labour migration from 
rural areas often represents a response 
to inequality as disadvantaged groups 
attempt to improve their relative socio-
economic position. Based on evidence 
from a large number of  village studies, 
his research showed that migration rates 
were higher from villages with high 
85 UNDP 2009
86 Lipton 1980
inequality. At the same time, migration 
also led to increase in income inequality 
within the village as better-off  segments 
got pulled to migration to take 
advantage of  better opportunities, while 
the poor were pushed out to migrate 
which widened the inequalities between 
these groups. “Thus ‘push’ and ‘pull’ 
migration are twin children of  inequality 
in the same sort of  village; but they 
are also sources of  new inequality.”87 
However, between these poverty-push and 
income-pull migrants lie those individuals 
and households who lack opportunities 
to successfully partake in migration 
because they face several constrains on 
their mobility. They can include entire 
households who are left-behind and 
unable to engage in migration, as well 
as individual members from within 
the migrant household who face the 
burden of  social roles and expectations 
that constrain their mobility. Based on 
the literature, I identify three such left-
behind groups including, i) households 
who are left-behind from migration 
because they lack the requisite 
financial means and social networks 
that successful migration requires, ii) 
women whose gender social roles restrict 
their mobility, and iii) youth whose life 
aspirations do not match the precarious, 
informal jobs that rural-urban migration 
offers. The discussion below focuses 
87 Ibid, p. 4
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on these left-behind groups and the 
key issues and implications that emerge 
from each.
4.1 Left-behind households 
First, at the level of  household, village-
level studies in India show that poorest 
households are often least able to 
migrate because of  their inability to bear 
the initial costs of  migration.88 In India, 
socio-economically disadvantaged social 
groups, particularly those belonging to 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, 
face high barriers to mobility; when they 
do move, much of  the migration among 
them is characteristically temporary, 
and often distress-driven.89 Moreover, 
at their work destinations, they are 
more vulnerable to cheating, abuse and 
discrimination90 which can (and often 
does) have the effect of  discouraging 
migration. In other words, “it is seldom 
the poorest who migrate, still less migrate 
successfully.”91 This inequality-induced 
selectivity of  migration means that 
they are households who are unable to 
transition to urban-nonfarm, migration-
based jobs. This can have both positive 
and negative effects on the households 
left behind. There are at least two broad 
set of  effects: i) economic wellbeing, ii) 
social change. 
88 Connell et al. 1976
89 Keshri & Bhagat 2012
90 Breman 1985, 1996, 2010
91 Lipton 1980, p. 7
To discuss the first issue of  
economic wellbeing, theoretically, with 
increasing number of  households 
engaging in work migration, this may 
lead to farm labour shortages which can 
improve wages for those households 
who do not migrate. In other in-
kind farming arrangements such as 
sharecropping, which typically involves 
landed households leasing out land 
to landless and land-poor households 
in exchange for certain quantity of  
the produce (typically amounting to 
half  of  the total harvest), migration-
induced labour shortages may improve 
the economic bargaining position of  
tenants to demand better terms of  
sharecropping. Indeed, analysis of  
nationwide NSS data reveals that in 
India there has been a rise in ‘non-
cultivating peasant households’ – 
households who are diversifying their 
livelihoods away from farming while 
holding onto land.92 This potentially has 
the effect of  increasing access to land 
among the land-poor and landless rural 
households from disadvantaged social 
groups. Evidence on migration-tenancy 
linkages is scarce but research points to 
these linkages. Research in Bangladesh 
shows rural-urban migration increased 
the incidence of  land tenancy which 
benefitted the “land-poor households 
92 Vijay 2012
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[who] got additional access to land”.93 
In terms of  how these altered land 
relations relate to wellbeing of  the left-
behind, the access to land among the 
disadvantaged groups can improve their 
food security94 and thus contributing 
positively to overall living standards. 
This access to land can be particularly 
important in the context of  high 
volatility in food prices.95 On the negative 
side, gains accruing from remittances 
to migrant households can further 
increase income inequalities between 
households with and without migrants. 
Michael Lipton’s research, cited earlier, 
showed that relatively better-off  
segments of  population responded to 
migration “either to obtain education 
or to exploit the higher urban-rural 
income differentials to which earlier 
education has given access…[which] 
allows the better-off  to advance as a 
group”, thus widening the economic 
inequalities within the same village.96 
More recent research across varied 
contexts corroborates this inequality-
increasing tendency of  migration. 
In Ghana, internal and international 
remittances were both associated 
with increased income inequalities in 
migrant-sending rural areas.97 A recent 
93 Afsar 2004, pp. 80-81
94 Choithani 2015
95 Pritchard 2014
96 Lipton 1980, p. 4
97 Adams, Cuecuecha & Page 2008
study in China showed that while 
rural-urban migration boosted average 
rural incomes in general, it also led to 
increase in ethnicity-based inequality 
with ethnic minorities faring poorer.98 
Thus, remittances help the poor to 
lift themselves out of  poverty but can 
reinforce existing economic inequalities. 
Economic remittances are 
important to understanding the 
migration-inequality relationship. 
But migration is simultaneously a 
social process, and labour migrants 
also transmit in origin places ideas, 
knowledge and exposure they gain in 
their work destinations, often referred 
to as “social remittances”.99 These social 
remittances can provide important tools 
for marginalised groups to resist unequal 
power relations in origin communities.100 
This brings us to the second key 
dimension of  migration-inequality 
relationship: that of  social change. 
In rural India, land has traditionally 
remained a key axis of  political power. 
In general, land control by the Forward 
Caste groups accorded them greater 
political power and representation in the 
local affairs. The disadvantaged social 
groups, often belonging to Scheduled 
Caste/Scheduled Tribe, depended on 
landholding communities for their 
98 Howell 2017
99 Levitt 1998, p. 926
100 Gidwani & Sivaramakrishnan 2003a
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livelihoods in exploitative relationships, 
such as that of  attached labour.101 
However, labour migration challenges 
these economic relations. A number 
of  longitudinal studies in India have 
shown that access to nonfarm, non-
local jobs has enabled the disadvantaged 
households to break free of  these 
exploitative relations.102 Agrarian 
decline and growing significance of  
nonfarm, migration-based jobs in 
households’ livelihood portfolios has 
changed the traditional, land-centric 
basis of  local power relations. In many 
cases, migration has allowed the land-
poor communities from disadvantaged 
social groups to improve their economic 
fortunes and alter the power relations in 
rural communities. Field-based, primary 
research in eastern Bihar shows that 
migration helped the land-poor Muslims 
households to escape the hegemony 
of  a local landlord and become more 
significant political actors locally.103 The 
circular nature of  India in India means 
migrants continue to be involved in the 
politics at origin villages.104 Research 
on seasonal rural-urban migrants 
from Golla Caste (low caste) engaged 
in construction industry in Andhra 
Pradesh shows that even though urban 
101 Jodhka 1994
102 Breman 1996; Jodhka 2014; Dutta et al. 2014; 
Himanshu & Stern 2016
103 Haque forthcoming
104 Gidwani & Sivaramakrishnan 2003b, p. 340
jobs provide income sources, labour 
migrants remain politically active in 
their home village. In fact, it is the rural 
sites where migrants’ struggles and 
demands are focused rather than cities. 
This is because rural areas are where 
state’s interventions are focused in the 
form of  various development schemes 
(e.g. PDS), whereas the state is virtually 
absent in the urban arena for the 
migrant workers. Indeed, in cities Golla 
migrants accept docility, invisibility and 
even dominance by other social groups, 
but use their migration experience to 
negotiate a better position within the 
village social power relationships.105 
Similarly, research in rural Maharashtra 
reveals that migration incomes has led 
to collapse of  Saldari system of  contract 
labour whereby farm labourers from low 
caste worked for dominant landlords 
under conditions of  serfdom and has 
enabled the members of  disadvantaged 
castes to resist and escape the patronage 
relations.106 These findings highlight the 
transformative potential of  migration 
for the traditionally marginalised 
groups. Recent evidence also shows 
that migration propensities among 
the socio-economically deprived are 
catching up with better-off  groups.107 
At the same time, as noted earlier, many 
105 Picherit 2012
106 Rai 2018
107 Vartak, Tumbe & Bhide 2018
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poorest households from traditionally 
disadvantaged social backgrounds still 
find it difficult to transition to migration 
jobs because they lack the requisite 
financial and social capital; they continue 
to have to rely on agriculture sector 
for livelihoods. Indeed, agriculture 
labour in India remains dominated by 
those without any education, and those 
from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes.108 We know nothing about 
how these left-behind households are 
affected in this reconfiguration of  local 
power relations. It is perhaps the case 
that the rising migration propensities 
among the traditionally disadvantaged 
groups benefit the left-behind 
households sharing similar marginalised 
backgrounds from the general alteration 
in unequal power relations. At the same 
time, it is likely that their continued 
dependency on land-based livelihoods 
hampers their ability to instigate effective 
social change. This issue warrants more 
detailed and systematic research. 
4.2 Left-behind women
Inequalities operate within the sphere 
of  household, too, which can lead to 
differentials in migration propensities 
among the members of  migrant 
households. Migration often represents 
a combined household strategy whereby 
rural households allocate labour across 
108 Lanjouw & Murgai 2009
a diverse set of  farm and nonfarm 
activities to maximize income gains 
and minimize risks.109 This means 
that some members of  the household 
migrate to earn incomes at distant 
locations, while others stay behind to 
look after land and agriculture at the 
origin. The precariousness of  rural 
transition in India makes holding onto 
land even more attractive.110 However, 
and this is important, household 
migration decisions are influenced by 
social arrangements, and interpersonal 
inequalities within the members of  the 
household play an important role in the 
process. Prominent among them are 
gender-based inequalities in migration. In 
many parts of  India, socio-cultural norms 
restrict the mobility and participation 
of  women in distant locations, and 
labour mobility is almost exclusively 
a male-only activity. Nationwide data 
shows that this male migration pattern 
is prevalent in regions covering over 
200 million people.111 This male-only 
migration often triggers fundamental 
changes in gender power relations. From 
the perspective of  migration-inequality 
relationship, here too, there are two 
broad set of  effects of  male migration 
for the women left behind. These include 
i) improved agency and autonomy for 
109 Stark 1991
110 Pani 2019
111 Tumbe 2012, 2015
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women that can reduce gender-based 
inequalities, and ii) increased burden of  
households’ productive and reproductive 
responsibilities that can exacerbate 
unequal gender relations.
First, several studies show that 
male migration enhances the agency 
and autonomy of  women who are left 
behind, as they assume greater decision-
making roles within the household while 
the men are away.112 In some cases, these 
autonomy effects prevail even after the 
return of  men.113 Research also reveals 
that the practice of  purdah seemed 
to be less common among women 
married to migrants than those married 
to non-migrants in India.114 As noted 
earlier, migrants also transmit in their 
home communities social remittances 
in the form of  new ideas, norms and 
knowledge, and rural migrants’ exposure 
to progressive gender social norms at 
urban work destinations often challenges 
the gender orthodoxy.115 Family context 
has a bearing on autonomy: Women in 
the nuclear family structure often gain 
more freedom than those in the joint/
extended families where elder household 
members (e.g. father/mother-in-law) 
step in for absentee men to control 
household matters and maintain 
112 Gulati 1987, 1993; Hadi 2001; Paris et al. 2005; 
Choithani 2020
113 Yabiku, Agadjanian & Sevoyan 2010
114 Desai and Banerji 2008
115 Choithani 2020
established patriarchal norms116, though 
joint families can provide enhanced 
psychosocial support to women in the 
absence of  their husband. Migration can 
also alter these familial structures, from 
joint to nuclear households and vice 
versa. A study in Kerala involving 132 
migrants’ wives showed male migration 
resulted in greater self-confidence 
among women, and that nearly half  
of  the sample women wanted to live 
independently after their husbands 
moved because they liked the autonomy 
their husbands’ migration brought 
about which would not have been 
available in the joint family set up.117 The 
remittances sent by migrant husbands 
often enhance women’s position within 
the household, and provide resources 
to invest in food, education and health. 
Leela Gulati’s pioneering study on the 
subject matter that focused on male-
migration from Kerala, India to the 
Middle East documented that left-
behind women spent the remittances 
they received in child education and 
women and child health.118 Similarly, a 
study on left-behind women in Garhwal 
district of  Uttarakhand, India on 
involving a sample of  250 households 
with migrant husbands and 250 with 
non-migrant husbands found that the 
former had higher overall incomes 
116 Desai & Banerji 2008; Ahmed 2020
117 Sekhar 1996
118 Gulati 1993
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and savings, and spent more on 
consumption, education and health.119 
Moreover, managing remittances to run 
the household is also found to increase 
women’s financial literacy as they deal 
with formal institutions such as banks. 
Recent research based on India Human 
Development Survey (IHDS) data 
covering a nationwide sample of  19,737 
women found that left-behind migrants’ 
wives were significantly more likely 
to have a bank account those women 
married to non-migrants, in both 
nuclear and joint family structures.120 
This also broadens women’s vision of  
managing household financial matters 
efficiently.121 Women’s control over 
household finances can not only result 
in equitable gender outcomes but also 
maximize household welfare. This is 
because in many societies, women often 
place the interests of  family over their 
individual welfare. For rural India, it has 
been observed that: 
If  a typical Indian rural woman was 
asked about her personal 'welfare’, she 
would find the question unintelligible, 
and if  she is able to reply, she may 
answer the question in terms of  her 
reading of  the welfare of  her family. 
The idea of  personal welfare may itself  
be unviable in such a context.122 
119 Negi 2015
120 Lei and Desai 2021
121 Gulati 1987, 1993
122 Das and Nicholas 1981 cited in Sen 1987, pp. 
6-7 
Thus, the migration of  men has the 
potential to enhance women’s agency 
and autonomy and produce gender-
equal outcomes. 
At the same time, male migration 
can also worsen the gender-based 
vulnerabilities women face. The 
precarious of  India’s ongoing rural 
transformation means that in many 
cases migrants’ remittances may not 
be adequate to support the household, 
and the left-behind women may find 
themselves with an added burden of  
household’s productive functions. 
Village level case studies in India show 
that male migration resulted in women 
performing greater tasks in family 
agriculture, including those that were 
traditionally carried out by men.123 
Indeed, male migration is a leading 
driver of  feminization of  agriculture 
in India. While women’s greater 
involvement in productive domain is 
often viewed positively for improving 
their bargaining position124, this can also 
exacerbate gender-based inequalities. 
Recent research on women in 
agriculture in India shows that women’s 
growing participation in agriculture is 
occurring in the context rising stress 
on farm-based livelihoods which is 
leading instead to feminization of  farm 
123 Jetley 1987; Paris et al. 2005; Choithani 2020
124 Sen 1987
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distress.125 Crucially, moreover, women’s 
growing involvement in farming adds to 
the already heavy demands of  domestic 
duties and care work for most rural 
women in India which undermines 
wellbeing outcomes. For instance, 
research in western Bihar shows that 
women-headed households where 
men were absent due to migration had 
poorer food security than those headed 
by men.126 It is important to note that 
women’s involvement in agriculture 
does not grant them land ownership 
rights, and land control largely remains 
with men.127 The added burden of  
responsibility can also affect women’s 
health negatively, and recent research in 
India based on nationally representative 
IHDS data, cited earlier, showed that 
absence of  husbands due to migration 
had an overall negative impact on left-
behind women’s self-reported health, 
and that extra burden of  responsibilities 
contributed to poor health outcomes.128 
The gendered impacts of  added burden 
of  productive functions often extend to 
other family members. Children are at 
particular risk. For the children of  Gulf  
male migrants in Kerala, for instance, it 
has been observed that: 
Such children are becoming delinquents 
and turning to drugs. Mothers who 
125 Pattnaik et al. 2018
126 Choithani 2020
127 Agarwal 1994
128 Lei & Desai 2021
have to take full control of  the children 
are finding it difficult in the absence of  
the supporting presence of  the fathers. 
Psychiatrists have even coined a new 
term: the “Gulf  Syndrome”.129 
The increasing workload on 
migrants’ wives may also alter the 
dynamics of  family labour which 
oftentimes demands children having 
to compensate for the labour of  
absentee men; young girls may be 
adversely affected by male migration 
as they may have to bear additional 
domestic responsibilities and take care 
of  younger siblings.130 Aside from 
these impacts caused by increased work 
burden, the disruption of  sexual life in 
the wake of  prolonged separation of  
male migrants from their wives raises 
the likelihood of  men seeking sexual 
relationships outside of  the wedlock. 
The stronghold of  patriarchal norms 
means that left-behind wives often 
find it difficult to exercise their agency 
to challenge their subjugation. In fact, 
migrants’ wives are routinely subjected 
to greater surveillance by their in-laws 
and extended family, are expected to 
adhere to expected gender social roles, 
and in some cases even ignore their 
migrant husbands’ other marriages.131 
129 Battistella & Conaco 1998, p. 226
130 Jetley 1987; Srivastava & Sasikumar 2003
131 Ahmed 2020
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In conclusion, while male 
migration can create more space for 
women to exercise their agency, it is 
not always accompanied by substantial 
changes in unequal gender social 
relations. In overall terms, the available 
evidence suggests that male migration 
often intensifies women’s gender-based 
vulnerabilities. 
4.3 Left-behind youth 
Finally, there may be individuals who do 
not face constraints on their mobility 
but choose to stay behind because the 
livelihood options available do not 
meet their aspirations. Young men and 
women with high education aspiring 
for regular, decent employment in 
a situation where most jobs are of  
informal, precarious nature that offer 
low economic (and social) returns form 
part of  this category of  left-behind. 
Educated unemployment among youth 
is a growing global problem132, and 
India is no exception to this worldwide 
trend.133 India’s rapid economic growth 
in the past few decades has enabled a 
small section of  country’s youth with 
professional education to be employed 
in highly remunerative, white-collar jobs 
and become a part of  global middle 
class (e.g. IT workers), but it has not 
adequately generated decent, formal 
132 Barford, Coombe & Proefke 2020
133 Mamgain & Tiwari 2016
sector jobs for a large majority of  
educated youth, particularly those living 
in small towns and villages. Structural 
economic change has generated images 
of  success based on education, and 
young people have increasingly invested 
in formal education to improve their 
life chances. Yet unemployment among 
educated youth has grown.134 Indeed, 
“at almost the precise moment that 
increasing numbers of  people formerly 
excluded from schooling have come to 
recognize the possibilities held out by 
education for individual improvement, 
opportunities for these groups to 
benefit economically from schooling 
are disintegrating.”135 The jobs that 
are available are predominantly in the 
informal sector, and rising aspirations 
for better life among the educated 
youth means that they find it difficult 
to accept poor quality, precarious jobs. 
Consequently, among the educated 
youth (those with diploma or degree 
above high school) the gap between 
labour force participation rate (those 
available for work) and workforce 
participation (those actually working) 
has increased in recent years; and 
unemployment rates are highest among 
the young, educated women who face 
greater burden of  social expectations 
than men to accept respectable, formal 
134 Azim Premji University 2019
135 Jeffery 2009, p. 182
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sector jobs.136 Data show that there are 
10 million educated unemployed in 
India137, and youth are overrepresented 
among the unemployed.138 It is important 
to note that this figure is likely to be 
an underestimate as stigma attached 
to unemployment often preclude 
young people to accurately report their 
employment status. This “Generation 
Nowhere”139 of  educated young men 
and women spend extended periods of  
time in search of  decent, regular-salaried 
jobs, so much so that job search itself  
has become a profession of  sorts.140 For 
them, education has not translated into 
tangible outcome in terms of  secure, 
regular-salaried jobs they aspire for, 
so they wait. Several structural factors 
militate against their aspirations for 
decent careers, including poor quality 
of  education in provincial colleges and 
high competition for scarce regular jobs. 
Caste and class inequalities interact with 
these outcomes, and success in finding 
scarce formal sector jobs depends on 
social class.141
These educated youth are no longer 
concentrated in large cities as was the case 
earlier, but they are increasingly spread 
across regional towns and villages.142 
136 Azim Premji University 2019
137 Mehrotra et al. 2014, p. 57
138 Azim Premji University 2018, pp. 41-42
139 Jeffery 2008, p. 739
140 Sharone 2007 cited in Deucher & Dyson 2019
141 Jeffery, Jeffery & Jeffery 2008; Jeffery 2010
142 Azim Premji University 2019
These youth away from metropolitan 
centres face greater marginalization 
due to geography.143 Field research on 
unemployed educated youth in small 
towns in India provide important 
insights on the strategies deployed by 
these young men to navigate economic 
uncertainty. In his research on youth 
and politics of  waiting in Meerut town 
in western Uttar Pradesh, Craig Jeffery 
shows young men with college education 
find themselves in the perennial state 
of  ‘waiting’ for decent employment 
opportunities. However, they are not 
passive actors, and in this waiting they 
engage in different ‘timepass’ activities, 
including participation in student 
politics as a makeshift career. This 
politics is not clearly defined and often 
contradictory (with some unemployed 
student leaders protesting against 
corrupt practices in colleges but also 
colluding with university administrators 
to benefit from their political position) 
but it also provides a means through 
which some educated youth engage in 
positive social action to fight inequality 
and corruption in education system.144 
Similarly, recent research on educated 
youth in Dehradun documents 
enterprising cultures among young 
men facing protracted unemployment 
and shows that these men created 
143 Brown, Scrase & Ganguly-Scraseet 2017
144 Jeffery 2010
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employment in coaching institutions 
through their practices, local knowledge 
and soft skills, though this employment 
was highly precarious still and most 
aspired for secure, well-paid jobs.145 
Since most of  the jobs are concentrated 
in large Indian cities, migration features 
prominently in the aspiration of  
youth from regional towns. But their 
mobility aspirations are often frustrated 
because their parents’ subjectivities 
still hold government jobs as central to 
modernity and aspiration as opposed to 
waged, part-time jobs.146 The continued 
pressure of  social expectations to get 
secure, government jobs in the context 
where public sector employment has 
shrunk, and most private sector jobs are 
of  informal, precarious nature is leading 
to an ever-greater number of  youth 
being left behind which has huge socio-
political implications.
First, protracted unemployment 
among young people mean that they 
remain in a state of  limbo which is 
delaying their transition from youth to 
adulthood, often for uncertain time.147 
Employment provides a key marker of  
youths’ transition into adulthood. In 
many developing countries, including 
India, young men derive their masculine 
status from paid employment given 
145 Deucher & Dyson 2019
146 Brown, Scrase & Ganguly-Scraseet 2017
147 Young & Jeffery 2012; Deucher & Dyson 2019
the widespread prevalence of  “male 
breadwinner norms”.148 But inability 
to secure (decent) employment means 
that it is becoming difficult for young 
men to find partners and many of  
them are remaining unmarried149, and 
thus are stuck in-between life stages.150 
Second, and relatedly, this besetting of  
life transition and consequent inability 
to assume normative responsibilities 
of  adults causes among them feelings 
of  anxiety, hopelessness and shame.151 
Third, educated unemployment can 
forge a culture of  masculine violence. 
Gender violence, including rape, is 
far too common in India, and failure 
to secure stable employment likely 
contributes to violent masculinities. 
Based on a study in a college in Chennai, 
Martyn Rogers argues that sexual 
harassment of  female students by lower 
caste young men represents latter’s 
response to subordination within higher 
education and white-collar jobs.152 
Fourth, prolonged unemployment can 
also create a sense of  victimhood, even 
among the youth from the privileged 
social backgrounds. In India, this 
sentiment of  victimhood among the 
young belonging to better-off  sections 
of  society is increasingly visible in their 
148 Jeffery 2009, p. 183
149 Chowdhary 2007, p. 457
150 Young & Jeffery 2012
151 Mains 2007; Deucher 2014
152 Rogers 2008
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opposition to reservations in education 
and employment for historically 
marginalised population groups. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed  the 
relationship between inequality, 
migration and development in India, 
with a focus on the impact of  three 
decades of  economic change on two 
key dimensions of  inequalities: spatial 
inequalities and inequalities between 
different socio-economic groups. 
The evidence presented in this article 
highlights that rapid economic change 
in India is accompanied by increased 
aggregate prosperity, but the benefits 
of  fast growth are not shared equally by 
different regions and population groups 
– far from it. The gains of  India’s recent 
economic growth have been highly 
concentrated, occurring in a few large 
cities within the more advanced states, 
while the laggard regions have slipped 
further behind. Furthermore, this 
concentrated, urban-centric growth 
has also been skill-intensive which 
has favoured a small section of  highly 
educated workforce in key business 
and service industries, such as finance 
and information technology, while a 
large majority of  India’s population 
scrambles to find decent livelihoods. 
These outcomes have occurred in 
a context where over two-third of  
country’s population still lives in rural 
areas and where overall education 
levels remain dismal. The urban-
based, nonfarm sector-led growth has 
heighted the significance of  work-
related migration. But urban jobs are 
precarious, nor are migration avenues 
available to all. In other words, India’s 
recent economic growth has been 
highly exclusionary in its distribution 
of  benefits across geographies and 
socio-economic classes and has created 
what this paper refers to as left-behind 
places and left-behind populations. 
This can have several socio-political 
and development implications.
First, spatial economic inequalities 
that leave places behind can create 
feelings of  alienation and discontent 
which can affect cohesion. These 
sentiments are increasingly visible in the 
responses of  left behind geographies to 
their marginalization and exclusion.153 
The Brexit referendum in the UK and 
the election of  Donald Trump in the US 
provide examples of  how left behind 
places are contesting their exclusion. 
In India, spatial inequalities have long 
been a source of  conflict. This divide 
has often created political tensions, 
with laggard states demanding special 
consideration in resource allocation for 
them to deal with underdevelopment 
while advanced states resenting not 
being rewarded for development. 
153 Rodríguez-Pose 2018
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Furthermore, within-state inequalities 
in development are also a key source of  
demands for separate statehoods. The 
bifurcation of  Andhra Pradesh in 2014 
in two states illustrates this. Second, left 
behind places also provide a breeding 
ground for social unrest. Indeed, in 
India Naxalite movement is most active 
in places that are believed to have been 
ignored in the development process. 
While early development planning 
in India recognised the importance 
of  regionally balanced development, 
the attempts to address the spatial 
imbalances were largely unsuccessful. 
The advent of  economic reforms since 
the early 1990s has created greater 
space for private sector to realize 
its entrepreneurial energies which is 
associated with improved economic 
performance overall. At the same 
time, private capital has tended to be 
highly concentrated which has widened 
the spatial divide in India. The early 
optimism that regional inequalities will 
narrow over time as economy advances 
seems to fade, and poorer regions are 
not catching up; if  anything they are 
falling further behind. And despite 
the rhetoric of  inclusive development, 
social policies to address development 
deficits in the laggard regions have 
not adequately followed. For its level 
of  development, public expenditure 
on social protection in India is among 
the lowest in the world154, and the 
institution to deliver social protection 
remain weak.155 
It is in this context of  spatially 
uneven development that the past few 
decades have led to substantial rise in 
labour migration from less developed to 
places that provide livelihoods. Indeed, 
the “immanent forces underlying 
migration are structural...and these 
structural features are embedded in 
the nature of  development” across 
different parts of  India.156 However, 
socio-economic inequalities curtail 
the mobility chances of  households 
and individuals. The discussion above 
has focused on three population 
groups being left behind including i) 
households who are unable to migrate 
due to weak socio-economic capital, 
ii) women who are left behind because 
socio-cultural norms restrict their 
participation in work-related migration, 
and iii) young adults whose mobility 
aspirations are thwarted by poor quality 
of  jobs. The discussion also points to 
the ramifications pertaining to each of  
these left behind groups. 
First, the inability of  households 
from socio-economic marginalised 
backgrounds to transition to migration-
based livelihoods can undermine their 
154 Dreze & Sen 2013
155 Pritchard et al. 2014
156 Srivastava et al. 2020, p. 2
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economic wellbeing and social status. 
While increasing involvement of  
households in labour migration can 
increase access to land among those who 
are left behind with positive impacts on 
their food and nutrition, the declining 
fortunes of  farm-based livelihoods can 
also undermine the gains from increased 
land access. The continued dependency 
on land and agriculture also means that 
they remain mired in conditions of  
dependency and patronage.  
Second, for women who are 
left-behind after their husbands’ 
migration, the evidence shows that male 
migration intensifies the gender-based 
vulnerabilities of  left-behind women. 
While absence of  men results in women 
assuming greater decision-making 
roles within the household which 
increases their autonomy, it also leads 
to women shouldering added burden 
of  responsibilities of  households’ 
productive and reproductive functions 
without any substantial alteration in 
unequal gender relations. In cases where 
remittances are not adequate, women 
often have to fend for the households 
aside from their care work which has 
overall negative impacts on left behind 
women’s health and wellbeing.
Finally, the lack of  stable, decent 
employment that prevents millions of  
educated youth in India to realize their 
mobility and life aspirations is retarding 
the transition of  youth to adulthood, 
with potentially huge impacts on their 
psychosocial health. High levels of  
unemployment among the youth who 
are arguably the most productive section 
of  labour force is also likely to have 
adverse effects on India’s development. 
These far-reaching socio-political 
and development implications of  
inequalities between places and people 
means that there is a pressing policy 
need to understand and address these 
inequalities. 
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